Tan v. People

Full Text: http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1998/may1998/115507.htm

Facts:

On October 26, 1989, about 6:30 p.m., in the town proper of Cajidiocan, Sibuyan Island, Romblon, Forest Guards Joseph Panadero and Eduardo Rabino intercepted a dump truck loaded with narra and white lauan lumber.  The truck was driven by Petitioner Fred Moreno, an employee of A & E Construction.  Again, about 8:00 p.m. on October 30, 1989, this time in Barangay Cambajao, Forest Guards Panadero and Rabino apprehended another dump truck with Plate No. DEK-646 loaded with tanguile lumber.  Said truck was driven by Crispin Cabudol, also an employee of A & E Construction.  Both motor vehicles, as well as the construction firm, were owned by Petitioner Alejandro Tan.  In both instances, no documents showing legal possession of the lumber were, upon demand, presented to the forest guards; thus, the pieces of lumber were confiscated.
Tan and Moreno, together with Ismael Ramilo, caretaker and timekeeper of A & E Construction, were charged by First Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Felix R. Rocero with violation of Section 68,[6] PD No. 705, as amended by EO No. 277. The accused were all convicted for failure to comply with the Forestry Reform Code which requires: (1) an auxiliary invoice, (2) a certificate of origin, (3) a sales invoice, (4) scale/tally sheets and (5) a lumber dealer permit. The CA found no cogent reason for the reversal or modification of the decision.

Issue:
(1) Whether or not Section 68 of EO 277 is unconstitutional.
(2) Whether or not "lumber" is to be construed as "timber" and/or forest product within the contemplation of PD 705.

Held:
(1) Section 68 deals with penalizing the "cutting, gathering and/or collecting timber or other forest products without license.". One of the essential requisites for a successful judicial inquiry into the constitutionality of a law is the existence of an actual case or controversy involving a conflict of legal rights susceptible of judicial determination. As Respondent Court of Appeals correctly pointed out, petitioners were not “charged with the [unlawful] possession of ‘firewood, bark, honey, beeswax, and even grass, shrub, ‘the associated water’ or fish;”  thus,  the inclusion of any of these enumerated items in EO 277 “is absolutely of no concern” to petitioners.  They are not asserting a legal right for which they are entitled to a judicial determination at this time.  Besides, they did not present any convincing evidence of a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution that would justify the nullification of said provision. A statute is always presumed to be constitutional, and one who attacks it on the ground of unconstitutionality must convincingly prove its invalidity.

(2) In Mustang Lumber Inc v. CA, Supreme Court held that lumber is included in the term timber. Lumber is a processed log or processed forest raw material.  Clearly, the Code uses the term lumber in its ordinary or common usage.  In the 1993 copyright edition of Webster’s Third New International Dictionary, lumber is defined, inter alia, as ‘timber or logs after being prepared for the market.’  Simply put, lumber is a processed log or timber. To exclude possession of "lumber" from the acts penalized in Section 68 would emasculate the law itself.