Amatan v. Aujero

Full Text: http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1995/sep1995/am_rtj_93_956_1995.html

Facts:
Rodrigo Umpad was charged with homicide. Upon arraignment, he and his counsel, the offended party and the public prosecutor entered into a plea bargaining whereby, with the approval of the judge, the information was amended to attempted homicide and the accused pleaded guilty thereto. The plea bargaining agreement was entered into and approved by Judge Aujero pursuant to Section 2, Rule 116 of the 1985 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure - which allows an accused with the consent of the offended party, to plead guilty to a lesser offense, regardless of whether or not such offense is necessarily included in the crime charged, or is cognizable by a court of lesser jurisdiction. Amatan filed an administrate suit against Judge Aujero for gross ignorance of the law for approving the plea bargaining agreement and sentencing the accused for the crime of attempted homicide, the Judge explained that what he did was in accordance with Section 2, Rule 116 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.

Issue:
Whether or not Judge Aujero is administratively liable for gross ignorance of the law.

Held:
Yes, Judge Aujero is guilty of gross ignorance of the law.

Section 2, Rule, 116 of the 1985 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, allows the accused in criminal case to plead guilty "to lesser offense regardless of whether or not it is necessarily included in the crime charged." The fact of death of the victim for which the accused Rodrigo Umpad was criminally liable, cannot by simple logic and plain common sense be reconciled with the plea of guilty to the lower offense of attempted homicide. The crime of homicide as defined in Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code necessarily produces death; attempted homicide does not. Concededly, hiatus in the law exists in the case before us, which could either lead to a misapprehension of Section 2 of Rule 116 or to outright confusion. Such a result was itself recognized by the Deputy Court Administrator when he recommended an amendment to the provision in his Memorandum.
However, the law is not entirely bereft of solutions in such cases. In instances where a literal application of a provision of law would lead to injustice or to a result so directly in opposition with the dictates of logic and everyday common sense as to be unconscionable, the Civil Code 5 admonishes judges to take principles of right and justice at heart. In case of doubt the intent is to promote right and justice. Fiat justice ruat coelum. Stated differently, when a provision of law is silent or ambiguous, judges ought to invoke a solution responsive to the vehement urge of conscience.
These are fundamental tenets of law. In the case at bench, the fact of the victim's death, a clear negation of frustrated or attempted homicide, ought to have alerted the judge not only to a possibly inconsistent result but to an injustice. The failure to recognize such principles so cardinal to our body of laws amounts to ignorance of the law and reflects respondent judge's lack of prudence, if not competence, in the performance of his duties.