Chrysler Philippines Corp. v. Court of Appeals

Facts:

Petitioner is a domestic corporation engaged in the assembling and sale of motor vehicles and other automotive products. Respondent Sambok Motors Co., a general partnership, during the period relevant to these proceedings, was its dealer for automotive products with offices at Bacolod (Sambok, Bacolod) and Iloilo (Sambok, Iloilo).

On October 2, 1970, Sambok, Bacolod, ordered from petitioner various automotive products worth P30,909.61, payable in 45 days; that on November 25, 1970, petitioner delivered said products to its forwarding agent, Allied Brokerage Corporation, for shipment; that Allied Brokerage loaded the goods on board the M/S Doña Florentina, a vessel owned and operated by Negros Navigation Company, for delivery to Sambok, Bacolod; that when petitioner tried to collect from the latter the amount of P31,037.56, representing the price of the spare parts plus handling charges, Sambok, Bacolod, refused to pay claiming that it had not received the merchandise; that petitioner also demanded the return of the merchandise or their value from Allied Brokerage and Negros Navigation, but both denied any liability.In its Answer, Sambok, Bacolod, denied having received from petitioner or from any of its co-defendants, the automotive products referred to in the Complaint, and professed no knowledge of having ordered from petitioner said articles.

Issue:

WON Sambok Bacolod bears the loss of the cargo for which it is liable in damages to Chrysler.

Held:

No, Sambok Bacolod cannot be faulted for not accepting or refusing to accept the shipment from Negros Navigation four years after shipment.

It was found out that upon receipt of the Bill of Lading, Sambok Bacolod initiated, but did not pursue stepts to take delivery as they were advised by Negros Navigation that because some party were missing, they would just be informed as soon as the missing parts were located. It was only four years later that the said parts were found in their off-shore bodega but were already deteriorated and valueless.The evidence is clear that Negros Navigation could not produce the merchandise nor ascertain its whereabouts at the time Sambok, Bacolod, was ready to take delivery. Where the seller delivers to the buyer a quantity of goods less than he contracted to sell, the buyer may reject them.

From the evidentiary record, Negros Navigation was the party negligent in failing to deliver the complete shipment either to Sambok, Bacolod, or to Sambok, Iloilo, but as the Trial Court found, petitioner failed to comply with the conditions precedent to the filing of a judicial action. Thus, in the last analysis, it is petitioner that must shoulder the resulting loss. The general rule that before, delivery, the risk of loss is home by the seller who is still the owner, under the principle of "res petit domino", is applicable in petitioner's case.

In sum, the judgment of respondent Appellate Court, will have to be sustained not on the basis of misdelivery but on non-delivery since the merchandise was never placed in the control and possession of Sambok, Bacolod, the vendee.

Norkis Distributors, Inc. v. CA

Facts:

Petitioner Norkis Distributors, Inc. is the distributor of Yamaha motorcycles in Negros Occidental. Alberto Nepales bought from the Norkis Bacolod branch a brand new Yamaha Wonderbike motorcycle. The price of P7,500 was payable by means of a Letter of Guaranty from the DBP, which Norkis’ Branch Manager Labajo agrred to accept. Hence, credit was extended to Nepales for the price of the motorcycle payable by DBP upon release of his motorcycle loan. As security for the loan, Nepales would execute a chattel mortgage on the motorcycle in favor of DBP. Branch Manager Labajo issued Norkis Sales Invoice No. 0120 (Exh.1) showing that the contract of sale of the motorcycle had been perfected. Nepales signed the sales invoice to signify his conformity with the terms of the sale. In the meantime, however, the motorcycle remained in Norkis' possession.

The motorcycle was then registered in the Land Transportation Commission in the name of Alberto Nepales. The motorcycle was delivered to a certain Julian Nepales who was allegedly the agent of Alberto Nepales but the latter denies it. The motorcycle met an accident and an investigation conducted by the DBP revealed that the unit was being driven by a certain Zacarias Payba at the time of the accident. The unit was a total wreck, was returned, and stored inside Norkis' warehouse.

DBP released the proceeds of private respondent's motorcycle loan to Norkis in thetotal sum of P7,500. As the price of the motorcycle later increased to P7,828 in March, 1980, Nepalespaid the difference of P328 and demanded the delivery of the motorcycle. When Norkis could not deliver,he filed an action for specific performance with damages against Norkis in the RTC of Negros Occidental.He alleged that Norkis failed to deliver the motorcycle which he purchased, thereby causing himdamages. Norkis answered that the motorcycle had already been delivered to private respondent beforethe accident, hence, the risk of loss or damage had to be borne by him as owner of the unit.

Issue:

WON there had already been a transfer of ownership of the motorcycle to Alberto Nepales at the time it was destroyed

Held:

No. The issuance of a sales invoice does not prove transfer of ownership of the thing sold to the buyer. An invoice is nothing more than a detailed statement of the nature, quantity and cost of the thing sold and has been considered not a bill of sale. In all forms of delivery, it is necessary that the act of delivery whether constructive or actual, be coupled with the intention of delivering the thing. The act, without the intention, is insufficient.

When the motorcycle was registered by Norkis in the name of private respondent, Norkis did not intend yet to transfer the title or ownership to Nepales, but only to facilitate the execution of a chattel mortgage in favor of the DBP for the release of the buyer's motorcycle loan. The Letter of Guarantee (Exh. 5) issued by the DBP, reveals that the execution in its favor of a chattel mortgage over the purchased vehicle is a pre-requisite for the approval of the buyer's loan. If Norkis would not accede to that arrangement, DBP would not approve private respondent's loan application and, consequently, there would be no sale.

In other words, the critical factor in the different modes of effecting delivery, which gives legal effect to the act, is the actual intention of the vendor to deliver, and its acceptance by the vendee. Without that intention, there is no tradition.

Article 1496 of the Civil Code which provides that "in the absence of an express assumption of risk by the buyer, the things sold remain at seller's risk until the ownership thereof is transferred to the buyer," is applicable to this case, for there was neither an actual nor constructive delivery of the thing sold, hence, the risk of loss should be borne by the seller, Norkis, which was still the owner and possessor of the motorcycle when it was wrecked. This is in accordance with the well-known doctrine of res perit domino.

Peope v. Manantan

Full Text: http://www.chanrobles.com/scdecisions/jurisprudence1962/jul1962/gr_l-14129_1962.php

Facts:
Guillermo Manantan was charged with a violation of Section 54, Revised Election Code. However, Manantan claims that as "justice of peace", the defendant is not one of the officers enumerated in the said section. The lower court denied the motion to dismiss holding that a justice of peace is within the purview of Section 54.
Under Section 54, "No justice, judge, fiscal, treasurer, or assessor of any province, no officer or employee of the Army, no member of the national, provincial, city, municipal or rural police force and no classified civil service officer or employee shall aid any candidate, or exert any influence in any manner in a election or take part therein, except to vote, if entitled thereto, or to preserve public peace, if he is a peace officer.".
Defendant submits that the said election was taken from Section 449 of the Revised Administration Code wherein, "No judge of the First Instance, justice of the peace, or treasurer, fiscal or assessor of any province and no officer or employee of the Philippine Constabulary, or any Bureau or employee of the classified civil service, shall aid any candidate or exert influence in any manner in any election or take part therein otherwise than exercising the right to vote.". He claims that the words "justice of peace" was omitted revealed the intention of Legislature to exclude justices of peace from its operation.

Issue:
Is justice of peace included in the prohibition of Section 64 of the Revised Election Code?

Held: 
Yes, it is included in Section 54.  Justices of the peace were expressly included in Section 449 of the Revised Administrative Code because the kinds of judges therein were specified, i.e., judge of the First Instance and justice of the peace. In Section 54, however, there was no necessity therefore to include justices of the peace in the enumeration because the legislature had availed itself of the more generic and broader term, "judge.", which includes all kinds of judges.
A "justice of the peace" is a judge. A "judge" is a public officer, who, by virtue of his office, is clothed with judicial authority. This term includes all officers appointed to to decide litigated questions while acting in that capacity, including justices of the peace, and even jurors, it is said, who are judges of facts.
From the history of Section 54 of REC, the first omission of the word "justice of the peace" was effected in Section 48 of Commonwealth Act No. 357 and not in the present code as averred by defendant-appellee. Whenever the word "judge" was qualified by the phrase "of the First Instance', the words "justice of the peace" were omitted. It follows that when the legislature omitted the words "justice of the peace" in RA 180, it did not intend to exempt the said officer from its operation. Rather, it had considered the said officer as already comprehended in the broader term "judge".
The rule of "casus omisus pro omisso habendus est" is likewise invoked by the defendant-appellee. Under the said rule, a person, object or thing omitted from an enumeration must be held to have been omitted intentionally. However, it is applicable only if the omission has been clearly established. In the case at bar, the legislature did not exclude or omit justices of the peace from the enumeration of officers precluded from engaging in partisan political activities. In Section 54, justices of the peace were just called "judges". Also, the application of this rule does not proceed from the mere fact that a case is criminal in nature, but rather from a reasonable certainty that a particular person, object or thing has been omitted from a legislative enumeration. In the case at bar, there is no omission but only substitution of terms.
The rule that penal statutes are given a strict construction is not the only factor controlling the interpretation of such laws; instead, the rule merely serves as an additional, single factor to be considered as an aid in determining the meaning of penal laws.
Also, the purpose of the statute s to enlarge the officers within its purview. Justices of the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, and various judges, such as the judges of the Court of Industrial Relations, judges of the Court of Agrarian Relations, etc., who were not included in the prohibition under the old statute, are now within its encompass.
The rule "expressio unius est exclusion alterius" has been erroneously applied by CA and lower courts because they were not able to give reasons for the exclusion of the legislature for the term "justices of peace".

San Pablo Manufacturing Corporation v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue

Facts: http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2006/jun2006/gr_147749_2006.html

Facts:

SPMC is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of milling, manufacturing and exporting of coconut oil and other allied products. It was assessed and ordered to pay by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue the total amount of P8,182,182.85 representing deficiency miller’s tax and manufacturer’s sales tax,among other deficiency taxes, for taxable year 1987. The deficiency miller’s tax was imposed on SPMC’s sales of crude oil to United Coconut Chemicals, Inc. (UNICHEM) while the deficiency sales tax was applied on its sales of corn and edible oil as manufactured products.
SPMC opposed the assessments but the Commissioner denied its protest. SPMC appealed to CTA but the tax on sales of corn and edible opils was only cancelled and the miller's tax was upheld. The CA, on the other hand, dismissed the petition on the ground that the verification and certification against forum shopping was lacking.

Issues:
(1) Whether or not the CA erred when it dismissed the petition on the ground that it did not comply with the requirements and verification against forum shopping.
(2) Whether or not SPMC's sale of crude oil to UNICHEM was subject to 3% miller's tax.


Held:
(1) No, CA did not err in the dismissal of the petition. Under Rule 43, Section 5 of the Rules of Court, appeals from the CTA and quasi-judicial agencies to the Court of Appeals should be verified. A pleading required to be verified which lacks proper verification shall be treated as an unsigned pleading.
Moreover, a petition for review under Rule 43 requires a sworn certification against forum shopping. Failure of the petitioner to comply with any of the requirements of a petition for review is sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition.
In the case at bar, the petition of SPMC was not properly verified. SPMC merely relied on the alleged inherent power of its chief financial officer to represent SPMC in all matters regarding the finances of the corporation including, among others, the filing of suits to defend or protect it from assessments and to recover erroneously paid taxes. SPMC even admitted that no power of attorney, secretary’s certificate or board resolution to prove the affiant’s authority was attached to the petition. Thus, the petition was not properly verified. Since the petition lacked proper verification, it was to be treated as an unsigned pleading subject to dismissal.

(2) SPMC's sale of crude coconut oil to UNICHEM was subject to the 3% miller's tax.

The language of the exempting clause of Section 168 of the 1987 Tax Code was clear. The tax exemption applied only to the exportation of rope, coconut oil, palm oil, copra by-products and dessicated coconuts, whether in their original state or as an ingredient or part of any manufactured article or products, by the proprietor or operator of the factory or by the miller himself.
The language of the exemption proviso did not warrant the interpretation advanced by SPMC. Nowhere did it provide that the exportation made by the purchaser of the materials enumerated in the exempting clause or the manufacturer of products utilizing the said materials was covered by the exemption. Since SPMC’s situation was not within the ambit of the exemption, it was subject to the 3% miller’s tax imposed under Section 168 of the 1987 Tax Code.

Where the law enumerates the subject or condition upon which it applies, it is to be construed as excluding from its effects all those not expressly mentioned. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius. Anything that is not included in the enumeration is excluded therefrom and a meaning that does not appear nor is intended or reflected in the very language of the statute cannot be placed therein.20 The rule proceeds from the premise that the legislature would not have made specific enumerations in a statute if it had the intention not to restrict its meaning and confine its terms to those expressly mentioned.
The rule of expressio unius est exclusio alterius is a canon of restrictive interpretation. Its application in this case is consistent with the construction of tax exemptions in strictissimi juris against the taxpayer. To allow SPMC’s claim for tax exemption will violate these established principles and unduly derogate sovereign authority.

Vera v. Cuevas

Full Text: http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1979/may1979/gr_l_33693_1979.html

Facts:
Private respondents herein, are engaged in the manufacture, sale and distribution of filled milk products throughout the Philippines. The products of private respondent, Consolidated Philippines Inc. are marketed and sold under the brand Darigold whereas those of private respondent, General Milk Company (Phil.), Inc., under the brand "Liberty;" and those of private respondent, Milk Industries Inc., under the brand "Dutch Baby." Private respondent, Institute of Evaporated Filled Milk Manufacturers of the Philippines, is a corporation organized for the principal purpose of upholding and maintaining at its highest the standards of local filled milk industry, of which all the other private respondents are members.
CIR required the respondents to withdraw from the market all of their filled milk products which do not bear the inscription required by Section 169 of the Tax Code within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the order. Failure to comply will result to penalties. Section 169 talks of the inscription to be placed in skimmed milk wherein all condensed skimmed milk and all milk in whatever form, from which the fatty part has been removed totally or in part, sold or put on sale in the Philippines shall be clearly and legibly marked on its immediate containers, and in all the language in which such containers are marked, with the words, "This milk is not suitable for nourishment for infants less than one year of age," or with other equivalent words.
The CFI Manila ordered the CIR to perpetually restrain from requiring the respondents to print on the labels of their product the words "This milk is not suitable for nourishment for infants less than one year of age.". Also, it ordered the Fair Trade Board to perpetually restrain from investigating the respondents related to the manufacture/sale of their filled milk products.

Issue:
Whether or not skimmed milk is included in the scope of Section 169 of the Tax Code.

Held:
No, Section 169 of the Tax Code is not applicable to filled milk. The use of specific and qualifying terms "skimmed milk" in the headnote and "condensed skimmed milk" in the text of the cited section, would restrict the scope of the general clause "all milk, in whatever form, from which the fatty pat has been removed totally or in part." In other words, the general clause is restricted by the specific term "skimmed milk" under the familiar rule of ejusdem generis that general and unlimited terms are restrained and limited by the particular terms they follow in the statute.
The difference, therefore, between skimmed milk and filled milk is that in the former, the fatty part has been removed while in the latter, the fatty part is likewise removed but is substituted with refined coconut oil or corn oil or both. It cannot then be readily or safely assumed that Section 169 applies both to skimmed milk and filled milk. It cannot then be readily or safely assumed that Section 169 applies both to skimmed milk and filled milk. Also, it has been found out that "the filled milk products of the petitioners (now private respondents) are safe, nutritious, wholesome and suitable for feeding infants of all ages" (p. 44, Rollo) and that "up to the present, Filipino infants fed since birth with filled milk have not suffered any defects, illness or disease attributable to their having been fed with filled milk."
Hence, applying Section 169 to it would cause a deprivation of property without due process of law.

Malanyaon v. Lising

Full Text: http://www.chanrobles.com/cralaw/1981julydecisions.php?id=19

Facts:

Mayor Pontanal was charged with violation of RA 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act). He was suspended from office but he died during his incumbency, and while the case was pending. The case was dismissed due to his death. Petitioner sought the payment of the Mayor's salary during his period of suspension pursuant to Section 13 of RA 3019 which provides - should a public officer be convicted by final judgement he shall lose all retirement or gravity benefits under any law, but if he is acquitted he shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits to which he failed to receive during his suspension. Malanyaon was a member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Bula, Camarines Sur. He filed an action to declare illegal the disbursement made by Goleta as Municipal Treasurer to the widow of Mayor Pontanal a portion of the salary of the late Mayor as such Mayor of such municipality during the period of his suspension from August 16, 1977 up to November 28, 1979. However, Judge Lising dismissed the action on the ground that the criminal case against Mayor Pontanal due to his death amounted to acquittal.


Issue:
Whether or not the dismissal of the case due to the death of the accused constitutes acquittal.


Held:
No. It is obvious that the statute speaks of the suspended officer being "acquitted". It means that after due hearing and consideration of the evidence against him the court is of the opinion that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt. Dismissal of the case against the suspended officer will not suffice because dismissal does not amount to acquittal.

Bernardo, et al., v. Bernardo et al

Full Text: http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1954/nov1954/gr_l-5872_1954.html

Facts:
On December 31, 1947, the Republic of the Philippines purchased from Roman Catholic Church the estate known as the "Capelania de Tambobong" in Malabon, Rizal, under the provisions of section 1, of Commonwealth Act No. 539. Said Act authorizes the expropriation or purchase of private lands and that lands acquired thereunder should be subdivided into lots, for resale at reasonable prices to " their bona fide tenants or occupants." Crisostomo R. Bernardo, respondent herein, applied to the Rural Progress Administration for the purchase of the lot in question. Petitioners Enrique Bernardo, et al ., contested the application and claimed preferential right to such purchase, and on January 12, 1948, the Rural Progress Administration resolved to recognize the petitioners as entitled to preference. The respondents then appealed to the Court of First Instance of Rizal, and the latter upheld their claim, and the decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

Issue: 
Whether or not the petitioners are bona fide occupants of the lot in question.


Held:
No, Enrique does not come under the description of bona fide tenant or occupant employed in the statute. The term "bona fide occupant" (admittedly petitioner is not a tenant) has been defined as "one who supposes he has a good title and knows of no adverse claim" (Philips vs. Stroup, 17 Atl. 220,221); "one who not only honestly supposes himself to be vested with true title but is ignorant that the title is contested by any other person claiming a superior right to it" (Gresham vs. Ware to that of a possessor in good faith in our Civil Law (Civil Code of 1889, art. 433; new Civil Code, art. 526). The essence of the bona fides or good faith, therefore, lies in honest belief in the validity of one's right, ignorance of a superior claim, and absence of intention to over each another.
It is also in contrary that the words "bona fide occupants" employed in the Commonwealth Acts are equivalent to "actual" occupants. The first reason is that Section 7  of Act 1170 of the old Philippine Legislature, employs the terms "actual bona fide settlers and occupants", plainly indicating that "actual" and "bona fide" are not synonymous, while the Commonwealth acts deleted the term "actual" and solely used the words "bona fide occupant", thereby emphasizing the requirement that the prospective beneficiaries of the acts should be endowed with legitimate tenure. The second reason is that in carrying out its social readjustment policies, the government could not simply lay aside moral standards, and aim to favor usurpers, squatters, and intruders, unmindful of the lawful or unlawful origin and character of their occupancy. Such a policy would perpetuate conflicts instead of attaining their just solution. It is safe to say that the term "bona fide occupants" was not designed to cloak and protect violence, strategy, double dealing, or breach of trust.
The SC ruled that a person who, at the time of the acquisition of the Tambobong Estate by the Government, has been gratuitously occupying a lot therein by mere tolerance of its lessee, and who does not own the house erected on such lot, is not a "bona fide occupant" entitled to its acquisition, as the term is used in Commonwealth Act. No. 539.

Tan v. People

Full Text: http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1998/may1998/115507.htm

Facts:

On October 26, 1989, about 6:30 p.m., in the town proper of Cajidiocan, Sibuyan Island, Romblon, Forest Guards Joseph Panadero and Eduardo Rabino intercepted a dump truck loaded with narra and white lauan lumber.  The truck was driven by Petitioner Fred Moreno, an employee of A & E Construction.  Again, about 8:00 p.m. on October 30, 1989, this time in Barangay Cambajao, Forest Guards Panadero and Rabino apprehended another dump truck with Plate No. DEK-646 loaded with tanguile lumber.  Said truck was driven by Crispin Cabudol, also an employee of A & E Construction.  Both motor vehicles, as well as the construction firm, were owned by Petitioner Alejandro Tan.  In both instances, no documents showing legal possession of the lumber were, upon demand, presented to the forest guards; thus, the pieces of lumber were confiscated.
Tan and Moreno, together with Ismael Ramilo, caretaker and timekeeper of A & E Construction, were charged by First Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Felix R. Rocero with violation of Section 68,[6] PD No. 705, as amended by EO No. 277. The accused were all convicted for failure to comply with the Forestry Reform Code which requires: (1) an auxiliary invoice, (2) a certificate of origin, (3) a sales invoice, (4) scale/tally sheets and (5) a lumber dealer permit. The CA found no cogent reason for the reversal or modification of the decision.

Issue:
(1) Whether or not Section 68 of EO 277 is unconstitutional.
(2) Whether or not "lumber" is to be construed as "timber" and/or forest product within the contemplation of PD 705.

Held:
(1) Section 68 deals with penalizing the "cutting, gathering and/or collecting timber or other forest products without license.". One of the essential requisites for a successful judicial inquiry into the constitutionality of a law is the existence of an actual case or controversy involving a conflict of legal rights susceptible of judicial determination. As Respondent Court of Appeals correctly pointed out, petitioners were not “charged with the [unlawful] possession of ‘firewood, bark, honey, beeswax, and even grass, shrub, ‘the associated water’ or fish;”  thus,  the inclusion of any of these enumerated items in EO 277 “is absolutely of no concern” to petitioners.  They are not asserting a legal right for which they are entitled to a judicial determination at this time.  Besides, they did not present any convincing evidence of a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution that would justify the nullification of said provision. A statute is always presumed to be constitutional, and one who attacks it on the ground of unconstitutionality must convincingly prove its invalidity.

(2) In Mustang Lumber Inc v. CA, Supreme Court held that lumber is included in the term timber. Lumber is a processed log or processed forest raw material.  Clearly, the Code uses the term lumber in its ordinary or common usage.  In the 1993 copyright edition of Webster’s Third New International Dictionary, lumber is defined, inter alia, as ‘timber or logs after being prepared for the market.’  Simply put, lumber is a processed log or timber. To exclude possession of "lumber" from the acts penalized in Section 68 would emasculate the law itself.

Song Kiat Chocolate Factory v. Central Bank of the Philippines

Full Text: http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1957/nov1957/gr_l-8888_1957.html

Facts:
During the period from January 8, 1953 to October 9, 1953, the plaintiff appellant imported sun dried cocoa beans for which it paid the foreign exchange tax of 17 per cent totaling P74,671.04. Claiming exemption from said tax under section 2 of same Act, it sued the Central Bank that had exacted payment; and in its amended complaint it included the Treasurer of the Philippines. CFI Manila dismissed the case on the ground that the term "chocolate" does not include sun-dried cocoa beans.

Issue:
Whether or not cocoa beans may be considered as "chocolate" for the purposes of exemption from the foreign exchange tax imposed by Republic Act No. 601 as amended.

Held:
No, exemption from Section 2 of chocolate does not include cocoa beans. Having in mind the principle of strict construction of statutes exempting from taxation,3 we are of the opinion and so hold, that the exemption for "chocolate" in the above section 2 does not include "cocoa beans". The one is raw material, the other manufactured consumer product; the latter is ready for human consumption; the former is not.
On the other hand, the congress approved Republic Act 1197 amending section 2 by substituting "cocoa beans" for "chocolate.". However, since statutes operate prospectively, the amendments cannot be applied in the case at bar. The appellant's cocoa beans had been imported during January - October 1953, i.e. before the exemption decree which is after September 3, 1954 pursuant to Proclamation No. 62,.

Kuenzle and Streiff v. Collector of Customs

Full Text: http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1915/dec1915/gr_l-10710_1915.html

Facts:

From the record it appears that the plaintiff and appellant imported into Philippine Islands a quantity of merchandise, which was invoiced as "cases roast coffee, chicory, cereals." Said merchandise was classified by the department of customs as "Bonanza mixture." Against that classification the plaintiff, through its attorney, protested, alleging "that the mixture is a product and manufacture of the United States, in chief value of the growth of the United States; the shipment came direct, was accompanied by the proper certificate of origin; the goods should have been passed free of duty as American products, under section 5 of American Tariff of 1909."

Said protest was duly considered by the Insular Collector of Customs, who decided that: "This claim for the free entry of certain `bonanza mixture' as a manufacture of the United States under section 12 of the Philippine Tariff Law of 1909, is overruled and denied, for the reasons stated in the decision of this office, on protest 7298 of the same importers (copy attached), which decision has been affirmed by the Court of First Instance of Manila.

As stipulated by the parties, the "bonanza mixture" is a mixture of coffee, cereals and chicory; that the coffee it contains was originally imported coffee it contains was originally imported into the United States in the bean, and was there roasted, ground and finally mixed with the chicory and cereals which are, nevertheless, products of the United States. According to the report of the Bureau of Science, the proportion of the mixture is about 50 per cent of real coffee and the rest is chicory and cereals.

Issue:

Whether or not the roasting, grinding and mixing of coffee with chicory and cerals constitutes a manufacture

Held:

The bonanza mixture is not a manifacture article. The Philippine Tariff Law of August 5th, 1909 in paragraph 242 provides for a duty upon coffee. said duty depends upon the condition of the coffee or the manner of its packing. Paragraph 243 provides for a duty on chicory. Paragraph 215 — 218 provide for duty upon various classes of cereals. There is no express provisions in the law of a duty upon a mixture of said articles.

In order to ascertain the ordinary meaning of these words, resort may be had to the definitions given by well-recognized lexicographers. Webster, in his valuable International Dictionary, defines manufacture as — "The operation of making wares or any product by hand, by machinery, or by other agencies; anything made from raw material, by the hands, by machinery, or by art, as clothes, iron utensils, shoes, machinery, saddlery, etc." Black, in his valuable Law Dictionary, defines manufacture as — "Any useful product made directly by human labor, or by the aid of machinery directed or controlled by human power, and either from raw materials or from materials worked up into a new form. Also the process by which such products are made or fashioned." Bouvier, in his Law Dictionary, defines manufacture — "To make or fabricate raw materials by hand or by machinery, worked into forms convenient for use;" and, when used as a noun, "anything made from raw materials by hand or by machinery or by art.

The application of labor to an article, either by hand or by mechanism, does not make the article necessarily a manufactured article within the meaning of that term as used in the tariff laws, unless the application of such labor is carried to such an extend that the article suffers a species of transformation and is changed into a new and different article, having a distinctive name, character or use. 

If the mixing of the different kinds of ground coffee or different grades of tea does not constitute manufacture, then it would seem to be reasonable to say that the mixture simply of ground coffee with other ground materials or articles such as chicory and cereals, would not constitute a manufacture.

The courts have been obliged to formulate their definitions in order to give effect to the purpose of legislative enactments, while lexicographers have been free to define said term upon the pure etymology of the word. Courts have been obliged to define the terms in order to make it applicable to practical affairs. It is the duty of the court to give the Tariff Law a strict interpretation, which will give force and effect to such law. The primary purpose of the law is to produce revenue.

Amatan v. Aujero

Full Text: http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1995/sep1995/am_rtj_93_956_1995.html

Facts:
Rodrigo Umpad was charged with homicide. Upon arraignment, he and his counsel, the offended party and the public prosecutor entered into a plea bargaining whereby, with the approval of the judge, the information was amended to attempted homicide and the accused pleaded guilty thereto. The plea bargaining agreement was entered into and approved by Judge Aujero pursuant to Section 2, Rule 116 of the 1985 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure - which allows an accused with the consent of the offended party, to plead guilty to a lesser offense, regardless of whether or not such offense is necessarily included in the crime charged, or is cognizable by a court of lesser jurisdiction. Amatan filed an administrate suit against Judge Aujero for gross ignorance of the law for approving the plea bargaining agreement and sentencing the accused for the crime of attempted homicide, the Judge explained that what he did was in accordance with Section 2, Rule 116 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.

Issue:
Whether or not Judge Aujero is administratively liable for gross ignorance of the law.

Held:
Yes, Judge Aujero is guilty of gross ignorance of the law.

Section 2, Rule, 116 of the 1985 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, allows the accused in criminal case to plead guilty "to lesser offense regardless of whether or not it is necessarily included in the crime charged." The fact of death of the victim for which the accused Rodrigo Umpad was criminally liable, cannot by simple logic and plain common sense be reconciled with the plea of guilty to the lower offense of attempted homicide. The crime of homicide as defined in Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code necessarily produces death; attempted homicide does not. Concededly, hiatus in the law exists in the case before us, which could either lead to a misapprehension of Section 2 of Rule 116 or to outright confusion. Such a result was itself recognized by the Deputy Court Administrator when he recommended an amendment to the provision in his Memorandum.
However, the law is not entirely bereft of solutions in such cases. In instances where a literal application of a provision of law would lead to injustice or to a result so directly in opposition with the dictates of logic and everyday common sense as to be unconscionable, the Civil Code 5 admonishes judges to take principles of right and justice at heart. In case of doubt the intent is to promote right and justice. Fiat justice ruat coelum. Stated differently, when a provision of law is silent or ambiguous, judges ought to invoke a solution responsive to the vehement urge of conscience.
These are fundamental tenets of law. In the case at bench, the fact of the victim's death, a clear negation of frustrated or attempted homicide, ought to have alerted the judge not only to a possibly inconsistent result but to an injustice. The failure to recognize such principles so cardinal to our body of laws amounts to ignorance of the law and reflects respondent judge's lack of prudence, if not competence, in the performance of his duties.

Macabenta v. Davao Stevedore Terminal Company

Full Text:

Facts:

Conrado Macabenta was a laborer in the sawmill of the Davao Stevedore Terminal Company ate Manay, Panabo, Davao, about 48 kilometers from his residence in Davao City. Although quarters were provided by the respondent to its employees at the sawmill  many of them preferred to commute and the deceased went home about thrice a week, to which the respondent furnished the transportation. On the day following the accident, Conrado and Leonora were lawfully wedded in a marriage ceremony solemnized at San Pedro Hospital, Davao City, where the deceased was hospitalized up to his death. Leonora gave birth to the posthumous daughter at the deceased named Raquel. 

Issue:

Whether or not the widow of a deceased employee whose marriage occurred after the accident as well as the posthumous child could be considered dependents within the meaning of the Workmen's Compensation Act.

Held:

Yes, they are dependents whiting that of expressed in the Workmen's Compensation Act. 

From the express language of the Workmen's Compensation Act, a widow living with the deceased or actually dependent upon him totally or partly as well as her daughter, if under 18 years of age or incapable of supporting him or herself, and unmarried, whether or not actually dependent upon the deceased are considered dependents.

It is also supported in the fundamental principle that once the policy or purpose of the law has been ascertained, effect should be given to it by judiciary. Even if honest doubts could be entertained, therefore, as to the meaning of statutory provisions, still respect for such a basic doctrine calls for a rejection of the plea of DSTC.

Assuming a choice is necessary between conflicting theories, that which best conforms to the language of the statute and its purpose should prevail. In US v. Toribio, SC held that no construction is to be adopted that would tend "to defeat the purpose and object of the legislator."

Therefore, the decision of the Workmen's Compensation Commission of awarding the claimant widow for herself and in behalf of her minor child the compensation and attorney's fees is affirmed. 

US v. Toribio

Full Text: http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1910/jan1910/gr_l-5060_1910.html

Facts:
The appellant slaughtered or caused to be slaughtered for human consumption the carabao described in the information, without a permit from the municipal treasurer of the municipality wherein it was slaughtered, in violation of the provisions of sections 30 and 33 of Act No. 1147, an Act regulating the registration, branding, and slaughter of large cattle.
It appears that in the town of Carmen, in the Province of Bohol, wherein the animal was slaughtered there is no municipal slaughterhouse, and counsel for appellant contends that under such circumstances the provisions of Act No. 1147 do not prohibit nor penalize the slaughter of large cattle without a permit of the municipal treasure.

Issue:
Whether or not the proper construction of the language of these provisions limit the prohibition contained in Section 30 and the penalty imposed in Section 33 to cases:
(1) of slaughter of large cattles for human consumption in a municipal slaughter house without a permit duly secured from the municipal treasurer, and
(2) cases of killing of large cattle for food in a municipal slaughter-house without a permit duly secured from the municipal treasurer.

Held:
The prohibition contained in section 30 refers (1) to the slaughter of large cattle for human consumption, anywhere, without a permit duly secured from the municipal treasurer, and (2) expressly and specifically to the killing for food of large cattle at a municipal slaughterhouse without such permit; and that the penalty provided in section 33 applies generally to the slaughter of large cattle for human consumption, anywhere, without a permit duly secured from the municipal treasurer, and specifically to the killing for food of large cattle at a municipal slaughterhouse without such permit.
Sections 30 and 33 prohibit and penalize the slaughter for human consumption or killing for food at a municipal slaughterhouse of such animals without a permit issued by the municipal treasurer, and section 32 provides for the keeping of detailed records of all such permits in the office of the municipal and also of the provincial treasurer.
Where the language of a statute is fairly susceptible of two or more constructions, that construction should be adopted which will most tend to give effect to the manifest intent of the lawmaker and promote the object for which the statute was enacted, and a construction should be rejected which would tend to render abortive other provisions of the statute and to defeat the object which the legislator sought to attain by its enactment. Therefore, sections 30 and 33 of the Act prohibit and penalize the slaughtering or causing to be slaughtered for human consumption of large cattle at any place without the permit provided for in section 30.

Hidalgo v. Hidalgo

Full Text:

Facts:

Respondent-vendor Policarpio Hidalgo was until the time of the execution of the deeds of sale on September 27, 1963 and March 2, 1964 in favor of his seven above-named private co-respondents, the owner of the 22,876-square meter and 7,638-square meter agricultural parcels of land situated in Lumil, San Jose, Batangas.

In Case L-25326, respondent-vendor sold the 22,876-square meter parcel of land, together with two other parcels of land for P4,000.00. Petitioners-spouses Igmidio Hidalgo and Martina Resales, as tenants thereof, alleging that the parcel worked by them as tenants is fairly worth P1,500.00, "taking into account the respective areas, productivities, accessibilities, and assessed values of three lots, seek by way of redemption the execution of a deed of sale for the same amount of P1,500.00 by respondents-vendees in their favor.
In Case L-25327, respondent-vendor sold the 7,638-square meter parcel of land for P750.00, and petitioners-spouses Hilario Aguila and Adela Hidalgo as tenants thereof, seek by way of redemption the execution of a deed of sale for the same price of P750.00 by respondents-vendees in their favor.
The petitioner-tenants have for several years been working on the lands as share tenants. No 90-day notice of intention to sell the lands for the exercise of the right of pre-emption prescribed by section 11 of the Agricultural Land Reform Code (Republic Act No. 3844, enacted on August 8, 1963) was given by respondent-vendor to petitioners-tenants. Subsequently, the deeds of sale executed by respondent-vendor were registered by respondents register of deeds and provincial assessor of Batangas in the records of their respective offices notwithstanding the non-execution by respondent-vendor of the affidavit required by section 13 of the Land Reform Code.


Issue:
Whether or not the plaintiffs as share tenants are entitled to redeem the parcel of land they are working form the purchases thereof, where no notice was previously given to them by the vendor, who was their landholder of the latter's intention to sell the property and where the vendor did not execute the affidavit required by Section 13 of RA 3844 before the registration of the deed of sale.
OR
Is the right of redemption granted by Section 12 of RA 3844 applicable to share tenants?

Held:
The code intended to afford the farmers' who transitionally continued to be share tenants after its enactment but who inexorably would be agricultural lessees by virtue of the Code's proclaimed abolition of tenancy, the same priority and preferential right as those other share tenants, who upon the enactment of the Code or soon thereafter were earlier converted by fortuitous circumstance into agricultural lessees, to acquire the lands under their cultivation in the event of their voluntary sale by the owner or of their acquisition, by expropriation or otherwise, by the Land Authority. It then becomes the court's duty to enforce the intent and will of the Code, for "... (I)n fact, the spirit or intention of a statute prevails over the letter thereof.' (Tañada vs. Cuenco, L-10520, Feb. 23, 1957, citing 82 C.J.S., p. 526.) A statute 'should be construed according to its spirit or intention, disregarding as far as necessary, the letter of the law.' (Lopez & Sons, Inc. vs. Court of Tax Appeals, 100 Phil. 855.) By this, we do not correct the act of the Legislature, but rather ... carry out and give due course to 'its intent.
Therefore, the decision of Agrarian Court is reversed and the petitions to redeem the subject landholdings are granted. In case L-25326 however  the case is remanded to the agrarian court to determine the reasonable price to be paid by petitioners therein to Procorpio Hidalgo for redemption of the landholding in accordance with the observations made.

Colgate-Palmolive Philippines, Inc., v. Gimenez

Full Text: http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1961/jan1961/gr_l-14787_1961.html

Facts:
On several occasions, it imported from abroad various materials such as irish moss extract, sodium benzoate, sodium saccharinate precipitated calcium carbonate and dicalcium phosphate, for use as stabilizers and flavoring of the dental cream it manufactures. For every importation made of these materials, the petitioner paid to the Central Bank of the Philippines the 17% special excise tax on the foreign exchange used for the payment of the cost, transportation and other charges incident thereto, pursuant to Republic Act No. 601, as amended, commonly known as the Exchange Tax Law.
On March 14, 1956, the petitioner filed with the Central Bank three applications for refund of the 17% special excise tax it had paid in the aggregate sum of P113,343.99. The claim for refund was based on section 2 of Republic Act 601, which provides that "foreign exchange used for the payment of the cost, transportation and/or other charges incident to the importation into the Philippines of . . . stabilizer and flavors . . . shall be refunded to any importer making application therefor, upon satisfactory proof of actual importation under the rules and regulations to be promulgated pursuant to section seven thereof.". The OIC of ETA of CBP approved the application for refund of the special excise tax on the foreign exchange used to import irish moss extract, sodium benzoate and precipitated calcium carbonate. However, the auditor of CBP refused to pass in audit its claims for refund even for the reduced amout fixed by OIC of ETA on the theory that toothpaste stabilizers and flavors are not exempt form Section 2 of ETC.
The Auditor General  affirmed the ruling of the auditor of the Central Bank, maintaining that the term "stabilizer and flavors" mentioned in section 2 of the Exchange Tax Law refers only to those used in the preparation or manufacture of food or food products.


Issue:
Whether or not the foreign exchange used by petitioner for the importation of dental cream stabilizers and flavors is exempt from the 17% special excise tax imposed by the Exchange Tax Law so as to entitle it to refund under Section 2 thereof.

Held:
The ruliong of Auditor General is based on the principle "general terms may be restricted by specific words, with the result that the general language will be limited by the specific language which indicates the statute's object and purpose". It is applicablle only to cases where, except for one general term, all the items in teh enumeration belong to or fall under one specific class.
In the case at bar, the items do not belong to the same classification.  On the basis of the grouping of the articles alone, it cannot validly be maintained that the term "stabilizer and flavors" as used in the above-quoted provision of the Exchange Tax Law refers only to those used in the manufacture of food and food products. This view is supported by the principle "Ubi lex non distinguish nec nos distinguire debemos", or "where the law does not distinguish, neither do we distinguish". (Ligget & Myers Tobacco Company vs. Collector of Internal Revenue, 53 Off. Gaz. No. 15, page 4831). Since the law does not distinguish between "stabilizer and flavors" used in the preparation of food and those used in the manufacture of toothpaste or dental cream, we are not authorized to make any distinction and must construe the words in their general sense. The rule of construction that general and unlimited terms are restrained and limited by particular recitals when used in connection with them, does not require the rejection of general terms entirely.
Therefore, the decision is reversed and the Colgate-Palmolive is entitled of the refund which was approved by OIC of the ETA in the thotal amount of P23, 958.13

Hagad v. Gozo-Dadole

Full Text: http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1995/dec1995/gr_108072_1995.html

Facts:

On July 22, 1992, criminal and administrative complaints were filed against Mayor Ouano, Vice Mayor Canete and Councilor Mayol, all public officials of Mandaue City by Councilors Dionson, Baricede. There respondents were charged with having violated R.A. No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act), as amended,Articles 170 (falsification of legislative documents)  and 171 (falsification by public officers)  of the Revised Penal Code; and R.A. No. 6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards of Public Officers). The respondent officials were allegedly causing alteration of Ordinance No. 018/92 by increasing the allotted appropriation from P3.5M to P7M without authority from Sangguniang Panlungsod of Mandaue. 

The respondent officials prayed for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that the Ombudsman supposedly was bereft of jurisdiction to try, hear and decide the administrative case filed against them since, under Section 63 of the Local Government Code of 1991, the power to investigate and impose administrative sanctions against said local officials, as well as to effect their preventive suspension, had now been vested with the Office of the President. On September 1992, a TRO against Hagad was filed and granted to the petitioners by RTC Mandaue to restrain him from enforcing suspension. 

Issue:

Whether or not the Ombudsman under RA 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1898) has been divested of his authority to conduct administrative investigations over local elective official by virtue of subsequent enactment of RA 7160.

Held:

No. The authority of the Ombudsman over local officials pursuant to RA 6770 is not removed by LG Code of 1991. 

There is nothing in the Local Government Code to indicate that it has repealed, whether expressly or impliedly, the pertinent provisions of the Ombudsman Act. The two statutes on the specific matter in question are not so inconsistent, let alone irreconcilable, as to compel us to only uphold one and strike down the other . Well settled is the rule that repeals of laws by implication are not favored, 16 and that courts must generally assume their congruent application. The two laws must be absolutely incompatible, and a clear finding thereof must surface, before the inference of implied repeal may be drawn. The rule is expressed in the maxim, interpretare et concordare legibus est optimus interpretendi, i.e., every statute must be so interpreted and brought into accord with other laws as to form a uniform system of jurisprudence.  The fundament is that the legislature should be presumed to have known the existing laws on the subject and not to have enacted conflicting statutes.  Hence, all doubts must be resolved against any implied repeal, and all efforts should be exerted in order to harmonize and give effect to all laws on the subject. 

The authority to conduct administrative investigation and to impose preventive suspension over elective provincial or city officials was at that time entrusted to the Minister of Local Government until it became concurrent with the Ombudsman upon the enactment of R.A. No. 6770, specifically under Sections 21 and 24 thereof, to the extent of the common grant. The Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160), in fine, did not effect a change from what already prevailed, the modification being only in the substitution of the Secretary (the Minister) of Local Government by the Office of the President.

People v. Pimentel

Full Text: http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1998/apr1998/100210.htm

Facts:

As early as 1983, Tujan was charged with Subversion under RA 1700 ( Anti-Subversion Law) as amended before the RTC Manila. A warrant for his arrest was issued on July 1983 but was unserved as he could not be found. 
Seven years after, Tujan was arrested on the basis of warrant of arrest in the subversion case. When arrested, an unlicensed revolver and six rounds of live ammunition was found in his possession. On June 1990, Tujan was charged with Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunition in furtherance of Subversion under PD No. 1866 before RTC Makati. Tujan filed a motion to quash the information invoking protection versus double jeopardy since he claims that alleged possession of firearms was absorbed in subversion. It was granted by RTC and CA.

Issue:
Whether or not RA 7363 (An Act Repealing RA 1700) should be applied retroactively to Tujan.


Held:
Yes, RA 7363 should be applied retroactively. The repeal by said law of RA 1700, as amended was absolute. There was no saving clause in the repeal.
Where, as here, the repeal of a penal law is total and absolute and the act which was penalized by a prior law ceases to be criminal under the new law, the previous offense is obliterated. It is a recognized rule in this jurisdiction that a total repeal deprives the courts of jurisdiction to try, convict and sentence persons charged with violation of the old law prior to the repeal.
With the enactment of R.A. No. 7636, the charge of subversion against the accused-private respondent has no more legal basis and should be dismissed. 

Gaerlan Jr v. Catubig

Full Text: http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1966/jun1966/gr_l-23964_1966.html

Facts: 
Gaerlan Jr and Catubig were registered candidates for councilors in 8-seat City Council of Dagupan in the 1963 elections. Catubig was proclaimed one of the eight elected councilors while Gaerlan lost his bid.
However, Gaerlan went to Court to challenge Catubig's eligibility for the office on the averment of non-age. Catubig was below 25 years of ages as of the date of the filing of his certificate of candidacy or date of election or date of assumption of office. Catubig claims that the question of age-eligibility should be governed by RA 170 which provides that the elective members of the Municipal Board shall be qualified electors of the city residents therein for at least one year and not less than 23 years of age and not RA 2259 which provides that no person shall be a city mayor, vice mayor or councilor unless he is at least 25 years of age, resident of the city for one year prior to his election and is a qualified voter.

Issue:
Whether or not Section 12 of RA 170 (23 years of age) should give way to Section 6 of RA 2259 (25 years of age).

Held:
No. Section 6 of RA 2259 (25 years of age) should prevail. RA 484 amending Section 12 of the Dagupan City Charter (RA 170), took effect on June 10, 1950 whereas RA 2259 became law on June 10, 1959.
The question whether or not a special law has been repealed or amended by one or more subsequent general laws is dependedt mainly upon the intent of Congress in enacting the latter. The discussions on the floor of Congress show beyond doubt that its members intended to amend or repeal all provisions of special laws inconsistent with the provisions of Republic Act No. 2259,except those which are expressly excluded from the operation thereof. All cities not particularly excepted from the provisions of said act are subjct thereto. Hence, the age-limit provision in RA 2259 is continuing, because Dagupan City was not excluded. Therefore, its charger provision on the age limit is thereby repealed. This is because the last statute si so broad in terms and so clear and explicit in its words so as to show that it was intended to cover the whole subject and therefore to displace the prior staute. 

National Power Corporation v. Arca

Full Text: http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1968/oct1968/gr_l-23309_1968.html\

Facts: 
On 26 December 1963, the Philippine Power and Development Company and the Dagupan Electric Corporation, filed an injunction suit in the Court of First Instance of Manila (Civil Case No. 55824) to restrain enforcement by the National Power Corporation of a revised rate of charges for the electric power and energy sold by said defendant, which schedule of new rates would take effect 1 January 1964. The Petition alleged, inter alia, that the disputed revised rates, which would increase the cost of electric power and energy being purchased from defendant by plaintiff Philippine Power and Development Company by 24% and that purchased by plaintiff Dagupan Electric Corporation by 30 %, are unreasonable, excessive and unnecessary; that the said revised rates had not been previously approved by the Public Service Commission; and that the unilateral revision by the defendant of the rate and its imposition upon the plaintiffs of the amended contracts embodying said new rates, without first submitting them to arbitration, was in gross violation of the provisions of the current contracts between them. Plaintiff filed a TRO to prevent the scheduled enforcement and was awarded to them. Defendant moved to dissolve the injunction but was dismissed by the court. Hence this petition.

Issue:

Whether or not the lower court has no jurisdiction over the matter and only the PSC was vested the said jurisdiction pursuant to Sections 13 and 14 of RA 2677.

Held:

No. The authority to inquire into the rates of charges for services rendered by NPC does not devolve upon the Public Service Commission. 

Commonwealth Act No. 120, creating the National Power Corporation, specifically provides that the NPC has the power/function/right to sell electric power and fix rate for any service rendered provided that the rates of charges shall not be subject to revision by the Public Service Commission. It is true that under Sections 13 and 14 of Republic Act 2677, amending the Public Service Act and approved on 18 June 1960, the Public Service Commission was vested with jurisdiction to fix the rate of charges by public utilities owned or operated by any instrumentality of the National Government or by any government-owned or controlled corporation. But the enactment of this later legislation, which is a general law, cannot be construed to have repealed or withdrawn the exempting proviso of Section 2, paragraph (g), of the earlier Commonwealth Act No. 120 above quoted. For it is now the settled rule in this jurisdiction that a special statute, providing for a particular case or class of cases, is not repealed by a subsequent statute, general in its terms, provisions and applications, unless the intent to repeal or alter is manifest, although the terms of the general law are broad enough to include the cases embraced in the special law. 

In the present case, there appears no such legislative intent to repeal or abrogate the provisions of the earlier special law. From the explanatory note to House Bill No. 4030, that later became Republic Act No. 2677, it was explicit that the jurisdiction conferred upon the Public Service Commission over the public utilities operated by government-owned or controlled corporations is to be confined to the fixing of rates of such public services, "in order to avoid cutthroat or ruinous and unfair competition detrimental to operators and to the public interests. No other conclusion appears possible, therefore, than that the authority of the Public Service Commission under Republic Act 2677, over the fixing of rates of charges of public utilities owned or operated by government-owned or controlled corporations, can only be exercised where the charter of the government corporation concerned does not contain any provision to the contrary.

Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters Association, Inc., et al, v. Feliciano

Full Text: http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1965/mar1965/gr_l-24022_1965.html

Facts:

On December 26, 1964, Jose Y. Feliciano, Chairman and General Manager of the Rice and Corn Administration, wrote the President of the Philippines urging the immediate importation of 595,400 metric tons of rice, thru a government agency which the President may designate, pursuant to the recommendation of the National Economic Council. The President submitted said letter to his cabinet for consideration and on December 28, 1964, the cabinet approved the needed importation. On January 4, 1965, the President designated the Rice and Corn Administration as the government agency authorized to undertake the importation. Considering that said importation, the Iloilo Palay and corn Planters Association alleged that it is contrary to RA 3453 which prohibits the government from importing rice and tat there is no law appropriating funds to finance the same. They said that it its illegal because it is prohibited by RA 3452 which in Section 10 provides that the importation of rice and corn is only left to private properties upon payment of the corresponding taxes. They claim that RCA is prohibited from doing so. According to them, RA 2207 which provides that should there be an existing or imminent shortage in the local supply of rice of suh gravity as to constitute a national emergency and certified by the NEC, the president may authorize such importation thru any government agency he may designate - is repealed by RA 3452.

Issue:

Whether or not RA 2207 which allows importation of rice by government agency during national emergency is repealed by RA 3452

Held:

No, RA 2207 is not repealed by RA 3452.

Section 16 of RA 3452 contains a repealing clause which provides "All laws or parts thereof inconsistent with the provisions of this act are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.". This repealing clause is not an express repealing clause because it fails to identify or designate the act/s that are intended to be repealed. Rather, is is a clause which predicates the intended repeal upon the condition that a substantial conflict must be found in existing and prior acts. Such being the case, the presumption against implied repeals and the rule against strict construction regarding implied repeals apply ex proprio vigre. The failure to add a specific repealing clause indicates that the intent was not to repeal any existing law, unless on irreconcilable inconsistency and repugnancy exists in the terms of the new and old laws. Here there is no inconsistency.

While the two laws are geared towards the same ultimate objective, their methods of approach are different; one is by a total ban of rice importation and the other by a partial ban, the same being applicable only to the government during normal period. Also, RA 3452 only authorizes importation during normal times, but when there is shortage in the local supply of sucy gravity as to constitute a national emergency, we have to turn to RA 2207. These two laws are therefore not inconsistent and so implied repeal does not ensue.

US v. Soliman

Full Text: http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1917/jan1917/gr_l-11555_1917.html 

Facts: 
Soliman, testifying in his on behalf in the course of another criminal case in which he, with several others, was charged with estafa, swore falsely to certain material allegations of fact. He testified falsely that a sworn statement offered in evidence in support of the charge of estafa, which was in effect an extrajudicial confession of his guilt, had not been executed voluntarily, and that its execution had not been procured by the police by the use of force, intimidation and prolonged torture. The trial judge who presided in the former case acquitted him on the ground that there was room for reasonable doubt. Soliman is however, guilty of perjury as defined and penalized in Section 3 of Act No. 1697. However, since judgement was entered on November 1915, section 3 of Act No. 1697 was expressly repealed by the enactment of the Administrative Code which was effective on july 1, 1916 and it has been suggested that the judgement convicting and sentencing the accused under the provisions of that statute should not be sustained and the repeal of the statute should be held to have the effect of remitting and extinguishing the criminal liability of the accused incurred under the provisions of the repealed law prior to the enactment of the Administrative Code. 

Issues: 
(1) Whether or not the repeal of Section 3 of Act No. 1697 by the enactment of the Administrative code had the effect of providing new and distinct penalties for the commission of the crime of perjury. 
(2) Whether or not the new penalties are more favorable to the convict in the case at bar than those imposed by the trial judge. 

Held: 
(1) Section 3 of Act No. 1697, which defined and penalized the crime of perjury, repealed the provisions of the Penal Code defining and penalizing the crime of perjury, not expressly, but by implication, and we are of opinion that the repeal of Act No. 1697 revived those provisions of the code. The old rule continues in force where a law which repeals a prior law, not expressly but by implication, it itself repealed; and that in such cases the repeal of the repealing law revives the prior law, unless the language of the repealing statute provides otherwise. In the case at bar, the express repeal of section 3 of Act No. 1697 by the enactment of the Administrative Code (Act No. 2657) revived the provisions of the Penal Code touching perjury, which were themselves repealed, not expressly but by implication, by the enactment of Act No. 1697. 
(2) The penalties prescribed in the Penal Code is less than that imposed in Section 3 of Act # 1697. Hence, the penalty imposed by the court below must be revoked and the penalty prescribed in the Penal Code should be imposed.

American Bible Society v. City of Manila

Full Text: http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1957/apr1957/gr_l-9637_1957.html

Facts:

In the course of its ministry, ABS has been distributing and selling bibles and/or gospels throughout Philippines and translating the same into several Philippine dialects. On May 1953, the acting City Treasurer of Manila informed ABS that it was conducting the business of general merchandise since November 1945 without providing the city with Mayor's permit and municipal license in violation of Ordinance No. 3000, as amended and Ordinances Nos. 2529, 3028, 3364 and required plaintiff to secure within three days the permit and license fees, together with compromise covering the period from fourth quarter of 1945 to second quarter of 1952 in P5, 281.45. ABS protested about the requirement but paid to the defendant the said permit and license fees in the said amount.

Issue:

Whether or no the Ordinances of Manila Nos. 3000 as amended, and 2529, 3028 and 3364 are applicable to the case at bar.

Held:

Yes, the city ordinances mentioned are still in force and effect.

When the old statute is repealed in its entirety and by the same enactment re-enacts all or certain portions of the pre-existing law, the majority view holds that the rights and liabilities whihc have accrued under the original statute are preserved and may be enforced, since the reenactment neutralizeds the repeal, therefore continueing the law in force without interruption.

In the case at bar, Ordinances Nos. 2529 and 3000 of the city of Manila were enacted by the Municipal Board of the City of Manila by virtue of the power granted to it by section 2444, subsection (m-2) of the Revised Administrative Code, superseded on June 18, 1949, by section 18, subsection (1) of Republic Act No. 409, known as the Revised Charter of the City of Manila. The only essential difference between these two provisions is that while subsection (m-2) prescribes that the combined total tax of any dealer or manufacturer, or both, enumerated under subsections (m-1) and (m-2), whether dealing in one or all of the articles mentioned therein,shall not be in excess of P500 per annum, the corresponding section 18, subsection (o) of Republic Act No. 409, does not contain any limitation as to the amount of tax or license fee that the retail dealer has to pay per annum. Hence, and in accordance with the weight of the authorities above referred to that maintain that "all rights and liabilities which have accrued under the original statute are preserved and may be enforced, since the reenactment neutralizes the repeal, therefore continuing the law in force without interruption", We hold that the questioned ordinances of the City of Manila are still in force and effect.

Montelibano v. Ferrer

Full Text: http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1955/jun1955/gr_l-7899_1955.html

Facts:

In 1940, the Subdivision Inc, of which Montelibano is the president and general manager, leased a lot to Benares for five years, with an option in favor of Benares of another five crop years. On 1951, the Subdivision instituted against Benares an unlawful detainer case which rendered a decision ordering him to eject from the said lot. However, Benares continued planting on the said lot, instead of delivering it to Subdivision. Acting upon Montelibano, his co-petitioners cleared the land of sugarcane planted by Benares. Hence, a criminal case was filed by Benares against petitiioners. A warrant of arrest was then filed to the petitioners. Monteibano and his companions filed a motion to quash the complaint and warrant of arrest  A civil case against Municipal Judge and Benares was filed alleging that the said judge had o jurisdiction to take cognizance of the criminal case.

Issue:

Whether or not the municipal court may entertain the criminal case relying upon CA 326, section 22 (Charter of the City of Bacolod) which provides that the City Attorney shall charge of the prosecution of all crimes, misdemeanors, and violations of city ordinances, in the Court of First Instance and the Municipal Court of Bacolod.

Held:

No, the Judge of Municipal Court has no jurisdiction over the case.

In the interpretation of reenacted statutes the court will follow the construction which they received when previously in force. The legislature will be presumed to know the effect which such status originally had, and by reenactment to intend that they should again have the same effect.

Two statutes with a parallel scope, purpose and terminology should, each in its own field, have a like interpretation, unless in particular instances there is something peculiar in the question under consideration, or dissimilar in the terms of the act relating thereto, requiring a different conclusion.

In the case at bar, the same provisions were contested in Sayo v. Chief of Police wherein it was held that in the City of Manila, criminal complaints may be filed only with the City Fiscal who is given the exclusive authority to institute criminal cases in the different courts of said city, under the provisions of its Charter found in Sec 39 of Act  # 183. The provisions of the Charter of City of Bacolod which are substantially identical to that of Manila should then be interpreted the same.

Therefore, the decision appealed is reversed and the warrant of arrest issued by the judge shall be annulled.

Erectors, Inc., v. NLRC

Full Text: http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1996/may1996/104215.htm

Facts:

In September 1979, Erectors recruited Florencio Burgos to work as Service Contract Driver in Saudi Arabia for 12 months with a salary of $165 and an allowance of $165 per month. Burgos will also be entitled a bonus of $1ooo if after the 12-month period, he renews/extends his contract without availing his vacation or home leave  His contract was approved by the Ministry of Labor and Employment.

However, the contract was not implemented. In December 1979, Erectors notified Burgos that the position of Service Driver was no longer available. On December 14, 1979, they executed another contract changing his position from driver to laborer with a salary of $105 and an allowance of $105 per month. This contract was not submitted to the MLE.

On December 1979, Burgos left the country and worked at Erectors Buraidah Sports Complex project in Saudi Arabia as a laborer. He received a monthly salary and allowance of $210. Burgos renewed his contract after one year and his salary and allowance were increased to $231.

Burgos returned to Philippines on August 1981. He then invoked his first employment contract. He demanded the difference between his salary and allowance in teh said contract and the amount paid to him.

On March 1982, Burgos filed wiht the Labor Arbiter a complaint for underpayment of wages and non-payment of overtime pay and bonus.

While his case was still in conciliation stage, EO 797 creating POEA was established  Sec 4(a) of E) 797 vested the POEA with "original and exclusive jurisdiction over all cases including money claims, involving employer-employee relationship arising out of or by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino workers for overseas employment."

Despite EO 797, Labor Arbiter proceeded to try the case and rendered judgement in favor of Burgos. In view of EO 797, Erectors questioned the jurisdiction of the LA in NLRC. NLRC dismissed the petitioner's appeal and upheld the LA's jurisdiction.

Issue:

Whether or not EO 797 applies retroactively to affect pending cases, including the complaint filed by Burgos.

Held:

No. The rule is that jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the law in force at the time of the commencement of the action.  On March 31, 1982, at the time private respondent filed his complaint against the petitioner, the prevailing laws were Presidential Decree No. 1691 and Presidential Decree No. 1391 which vested the Regional Offices of the Ministry of Labor and the Labor Arbiters with "original and exclusive jurisdiction over all cases involving employer-employee relations including money claims arising out of any law or contracts involving Filipino workers for overseas employment." At the time of the filing of the complaint, the Labor Arbiter had clear jurisdiction over the same.

Manila Jockey Club v. Games and Amusement Board

Full text: http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1960/feb1960/gr_l-12727_1960.html

Facts:

The authorized racing days specifically designated and distributed in Section 4 of RA 309 the basic law on horse racing in the Philippines amended by RA 983 are as follows: (1) Philippine Anti-TB Society for 12 Sundays, (2) PCSO - 6 Sundays (3) White Cross - 4 Sundays (4) Grand Derby Race of  PATS - 1 Sunday (5) Private Individuals and entities - 29 Sundays.

However, RA 1502 increased the sweepstakes draw and races of the PCSO from 6 to 12 Sundays, but without specifying the days on which they are to be run. To accommodate these additional races, GAB resolved to reduce the number of Sundays assigned to private individuals and entities by six.

Appellants protested that the said increase should be taken from the 12 Saturdays reserved to the President, for charitable relief OR should be assigned to any day of the week besides Sunday, Saturday and Legal Holiday.

Issues:

(1) Whether or not the petitioner has a vested right to the unreserved Sundays.

(2) Whether or not the additional sweepstakes races must be inserted in club races as debated in the House of Representatives in the voting of HB 5732/RA1502.

Held:

(1) No, the appellant has no vested right to the unreserved Sundays, or even to the 24 Saturdays (except holidays) because their holding on races for these days are merely permissive, subject to the licensing and determination by the GAB. When, therefore, RA 1502 was enacted increasing by 6 the sweepstakes draw and races but without specifying the days for holding them, the GAB had no alternative except to make room for the additional races, as it did, form among the only available racing days unreserved by any law - the Sundays on which the private individuals and entities have been permitted to hold their races, subject to licensing and determination by GAB.

(2) No. There is nothing in Republic Act No. 1502, as it was finally enacted, which would indicate that such an understanding on the part of these two members of the Lower House of Congress were received the sanction or conformity of their colleagues, for the law is absolutely devoid of any such indication.

In the interpretation of a legal document, especially a statute, unlike in the interpretation of an ordinary written document, it is not enough to obtain information to the intention or meaning of the author or authors, but also to see whether the intention or meaning has been expressed in such a way as to give it legal effect and validity. In short, the purpose of the inquiry, is not only to know what the author meant by the language he used, but also to see that the language used sufficiently expresses that meaning.

The language of Republic Act No. 1502 in authorizing the increase, clearly speaks of regular sweepstakes draws and races. If the intention of Congress were to authorize additional sweepstakes draws only which could, admittedly, be inserted in the club races, the law would not have included regular races; and since regular sweepstakes races were specifically authorized, and it would be confusing, inconvenient, if not impossible to mix these sweepstakes races with the regular club races all on the same day (and it has never been done before), the conclusion seems inevitable that the additional sweepstakes draws and races were intended to be held on a whole day, separate and apart from the club races.