Pfizer v. Velasco

Pfizer v. Velasco

G.R. No. 177467, March 9, 2011

FACTS:

Geraldine L. Velasco was employed with petitioner PFIZER, INC. as Professional Health Care Representative since 1 August 1992. Sometime in April 2003, Velasco had a medical work up for her high-risk pregnancy and was subsequently advised bed rest which resulted in her extending her leave of absence. Velasco filed her sick leave for the period from 26 March to 18 June 2003, her vacation leave from 19 June to 20 June 2003, and leave without pay from 23 June to 14 July 2003.

While Velasco was still on leave, PFIZER through its Area Sales Manager, Ferdinand Cortez, personally served Velasco a "Show-cause Notice" dated 25 June 2003. Aside from mentioning about an investigation on her possible violations of company work rules regarding "unauthorized deals and/or discounts in money or samples and unauthorized withdrawal and/or pull-out of stocks" and instructing her to submit her explanation on the matter within 48 hours from receipt of the same, the notice also advised her that she was being placed under "preventive suspension" for 30 days or from that day to 6 August 2003 and consequently ordered to surrender some of the accountabilities from her employer.

Velasco sent a letter denying the charges claiming that the transaction with Mercury Drug, Magsaysay Branch covered by her check (no. 1072) in the amount of P23,980.00 was merely to accommodate two undisclosed patients of a certain Dr. Renato Manalo.

Velasco received a "Second Show-cause Notice" informing her of additional developments in their investigation. According to the notice, a certain Carlito Jomen executed an affidavit pointing to Velasco as the one who transacted with a printing shop to print PFIZER discount coupons. Jomen also presented text messages originating from Velasco’s company issued cellphone referring to the printing of the said coupons. Again, Velasco was given 48 hours to submit her written explanation on the matter. On 16 July 2003, Velasco sent a letter to PFIZER via Aboitiz courier service asking for additional time to answer the second Show-cause Notice.

Velasco filed a complaint for illegal suspension with money claims before the Regional Arbitration Branch. The following day, 17 July 2003, PFIZER sent her a letter inviting her to a disciplinary hearing to be held on 22 July 2003. Velasco received it under protest and informed PFIZER via the receiving copy of the said letter that she had lodged a complaint against the latter and that the issues that may be raised in the July 22 hearing "can be tackled during the hearing of her case" or at the preliminary conference set for 5 and 8 of August 2003. She likewise opted to withhold answering the Second Show-cause Notice. On 25 July 2003, Velasco received a "Third Show-cause Notice," together with copies of the affidavits of two Branch Managers of Mercury Drug, asking her for her comment within 48 hours. Finally, on 29 July 2003, PFIZER informed Velasco of its "Management Decision" terminating her employment.

LA: The dismissal of Velasco is illegal. Reinstatement was ordered with backwages and further awarding moral and exemplary damages with attorney’s fees.

NLRC:

·         Upheld the ruling of LA, but deleted the award on moral and exemplary damages.

·         Pfizer then filed an MR but was denied for lack of merit in the next NLRC Resolution.

·         A special civil action for the issuance of a writ of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to annul and set aside the aforementioned NLRC issuances was filed to the CA

CA:

·         Reversed the ruling of LA and NLRC. Having found the termination of Geraldine L. Velasco’s employment in accordance with the two notice rule pursuant to the due process requirement and with just cause, her complaint for illegal dismissal was dismissed.

·         Velasco filed an MR with CA. It affirmed the legality of the dismissal of Velasco but directed Pfizer to pay her wages from the date of the Labor Arbiter’s Decision dated December 5, 2003 up to the Court of Appeals Decision dated November 23, 2005.

·         Velasco filed with the Court a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, which assailed the CA Decision but was denied by the SC’s Second Division.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA committed a serious but reversible error when it ordered Pfizer to pay Velasco wages from the date of the Labor Arbiter’s decision ordering her reinstatement until November 23, 2005, when the Court of Appeals rendered its decision declaring Velasco’s dismissal valid

Pfizer’s Contention:

·         There was no unjustified refusal on its part to reinstate Velasco during the pendency of the appeal. During the pendency of the appeal, PFIZER claimed that it had already required respondent to report for work on July 1, 2005. However, according to PFIZER, it was respondent who refused to return to work when she wrote PFIZER, through counsel, that she was opting to receive her separation pay and to avail of PFIZER’s early retirement program.

·         It should no longer be required to pay wages considering that (1) it had already previously paid an enormous sum to respondent under the writ of execution issued by the Labor Arbiter; (2) it was allegedly ready to reinstate respondent as of July 1, 2005 but it was respondent who unjustifiably refused to report for work; (3) it would purportedly be tantamount to allowing respondent to choose "payroll reinstatement" when by law it was the employer which had the right to choose between actual and payroll reinstatement; (4) respondent should be deemed to have "resigned" and therefore not entitled to additional backwages or separation pay; and (5) this Court should not mechanically apply Roquero but rather should follow the doctrine in Genuino v. National Labor Relations Commission which was supposedly "more in accord with the dictates of fairness and justice.

HELD: NO.

PFIZER’s previous payment to respondent of the amount of P1,963,855.00 (representing her wages from December 5, 2003, or the date of the Labor Arbiter decision, until May 5, 2005) that was successfully garnished under the Labor Arbiter’s Writ of Execution dated May 26, 2005 cannot be considered in its favor. Not only was this sum legally due to respondent under prevailing jurisprudence but also this circumstance highlighted PFIZER’s unreasonable delay in complying with the reinstatement order of the Labor Arbiter. A perusal of the records, including PFIZER’s own submissions, confirmed that it only required respondent to report for work on July 1, 2005, as shown by its Letter dated June 27, 2005, which is almost two years from the time the order of reinstatement was handed down in the Labor Arbiter’s Decision dated December 5, 2003.

An award or order of reinstatement is immediately self-executory without the need for the issuance of a writ of execution in accordance with the third paragraph of Article 223 of the Labor Code. The provision of Article 223 is clear that an award [by the Labor Arbiter] for reinstatement shall be immediately executory even pending appeal and the posting of a bond by the employer shall not stay the execution for reinstatement.  If the requirements of Article 224 [including the issuance of a writ of execution] were to govern, then the executory nature of a reinstatement order or award contemplated by Article 223 will be unduly circumscribed and rendered ineffectual.

In the case at bar, PFIZER did not immediately admit respondent back to work which, according to the law, should have been done as soon as an order or award of reinstatement is handed down by the Labor Arbiter without need for the issuance of a writ of execution. Thus, respondent was entitled to the wages paid to her under the aforementioned writ of execution. At most, PFIZER’s payment of the same can only be deemed partial compliance/execution of the Court of Appeals Resolution dated October 23, 2006 and would not bar respondent from being paid her wages from May 6, 2005 to November 23, 2005. It would also seem that PFIZER waited for the resolution of its appeal to the NLRC and, only after it was ordered by the Labor Arbiter to pay the amount of P1,963,855.00 representing respondent’s full backwages from December 5, 2003 up to May 5, 2005, did PFIZER decide to require respondent to report back to work via the Letter dated June 27, 2005.

Under Article 223 of the Labor Code, an employee entitled to reinstatement "shall either be admitted back to work under the same terms and conditions prevailing prior to his dismissal or separation or, at the option of the employer, merely reinstated in the payroll."

It is established in jurisprudence that reinstatement means restoration to a state or condition from which one had been removed or separated. The person reinstated assumes the position he had occupied prior to his dismissal. Reinstatement presupposes that the previous position from which one had been removed still exists, or that there is an unfilled position which is substantially equivalent or of similar nature as the one previously occupied by the employee.

it cannot be said that with PFIZER’s June 27, 2005 Letter, in belated fulfillment of the Labor Arbiter’s reinstatement order, it had shown a clear intent to reinstate respondent to her former position under the same terms and conditions nor to a substantially equivalent position. To begin with, the return-to-work order PFIZER sent respondent is silent with regard to the position or the exact nature of employment that it wanted respondent to take up as of July 1, 2005. Even if we assume that the job awaiting respondent in the new location is of the same designation and pay category as what she had before, it is plain from the text of PFIZER’s June 27, 2005 letter that such reinstatement was not "under the same terms and conditions" as her previous employment, considering that PFIZER ordered respondent to report to its main office in Makati City while knowing fully well that respondent’s previous job had her stationed in Baguio City (respondent’s place of residence) and it was still necessary for respondent to be briefed regarding her work assignments and responsibilities, including her relocation benefits.

It is well-settled that when a person is illegally dismissed, he is entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to his full backwages. In the event, however, that reinstatement is no longer feasible, or if the employee decides not be reinstated, the employer shall pay him separation pay in lieu of reinstatement. Such a rule is likewise observed in the case of a strained employer-employee relationship or when the work or position formerly held by the dismissed employee no longer exists. In sum, an illegally dismissed employee is entitled to: (1) either reinstatement if viable or separation pay if reinstatement is no longer viable, and (2) backwages.

In sum, the Court reiterates the principle that reinstatement pending appeal necessitates that it must be immediately self-executory without need for a writ of execution during the pendency of the appeal, if the law is to serve its noble purpose, and any attempt on the part of the employer to evade or delay its execution should not be allowed. Furthermore, we likewise restate our ruling that an order for reinstatement entitles an employee to receive his accrued backwages from the moment the reinstatement order was issued up to the date when the same was reversed by a higher court without fear of refunding what he had received. It cannot be denied that, under our statutory and jurisprudential framework, respondent is entitled to payment of her wages for the period after December 5, 2003 until the Court of Appeals Decision dated November 23, 2005, notwithstanding the finding therein that her dismissal was legal and for just cause. Thus, the payment of such wages cannot be deemed as unjust enrichment on respondent’s part.

Sps. Romualdez v. COMELEC

SPOUSES CARLOS S. ROMUALDEZ and ERLINDA R. ROMUALDEZ, petitioners, vs.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and DENNIS GARAY, respondents.
G.R. No. 167011 April 30, 2008
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.

Facts:

                Garay and Apostol filed a complaint against Sps. Romualdez for violation of the OEC and RA 8189 or Voter’s Registration Act of 1996 for making false information as to their residence in their applications as new voters in Burauen, Leyte.

                The Complaint-Affidavit contained a prayer that a preliminary investigation be conducted by the COMELEC, and if the evidence so warrants, the corresponding Information against petitioners be filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) for the prosecution of the same.

                Sps. Romualdez contend that they intend to reside in Burauen, Leyte since 1989. On May 2000, they took actual residence in Burauen by leasing for 5 years the house of Renomeron.

The Complaint-Affidavit contained a prayer that a preliminary investigation be conducted by the COMELEC, and if the evidence so warrants, the corresponding Information against petitioners be filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) for the prosecution of the same.

Issue: WON due process was violated.

Held: No.

First, the Complaint-Affidavit filed by private respondent with the COMELEC is couched in a language which embraces the allegations necessary to support the charge for violation of Section 10(g) and (j), in relation to Section 45(j) of Republic Act No. 8189.

Petitioners cannot be said to have been denied due process on the claim that the election offenses charged against them by private respondent are entirely different from those for which they stand to be accused of before the RTC, as charged by the COMELEC. In the first place, there appears to be no incongruity between the charges as contained in the Complaint-Affidavit and the Informations filed before the RTC, notwithstanding the denomination by private respondent of the alleged violations to be covered by Section 261(y)(2) and Section 261(y)(5) of the Omnibus Election Code and Section 12 of Republic Act No. 8189. Evidently, the Informations directed to be filed by the COMELEC against petitioners, and which were, in fact, filed with the RTC, were based on the same set of facts as originally alleged in the private respondent’s Complaint-Affidavit.

In Lacson, we underscored the elementary rule that the jurisdiction of a court is determined by the allegations in the Complaint or Information, and not by the evidence presented by the parties at the trial. Indeed, in Lacson, we articulated that the real nature of the criminal charge is determined not from the caption or preamble of the Information nor from the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated, they being conclusions of law, but by the actual recital of facts in the Complaint or Information.

Petitioners’ reliance on Lacson, however, does not support their claim of lack of due process because, as we have said, the charges contained in private respondent’s Complaint-Affidavit and the charges as directed by the COMELEC to be filed are based on the same set of facts. In fact, the nature of the criminal charges in private respondent’s Complaint-Affidavit and that of the charges contained in the Informations filed with the RTC, pursuant to the COMELEC Resolution En Banc are the same, such that, petitioners cannot claim that they were not able to refute or submit documentary evidence against the charges that the COMELEC filed with the RTC. Petitioners were afforded due process because they were granted the opportunity to refute the allegations in private respondent’s Complaint-Affidavit. On 2 April 2001, in opposition to the Complaint-Affidavit, petitioners filed a Joint Counter-Affidavit with Motion to Dismiss with the Law Department of the COMELEC. They similarly filed a Memorandum before the said body. Finding that due process was not dispensed with under the circumstances in the case at bar, we agree with the stance of the Office of the Solicitor General that petitioners were reasonably apprised of the nature and description of the charges against them. It likewise bears stressing that preliminary investigations were conducted whereby petitioners were informed of the complaint and of the evidence submitted against them. They were given the opportunity to adduce controverting evidence for their defense. In all these stages, petitioners actively participated. 

FULL TEXT: http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2008/apr2008/gr_167011_2008.html

Chrysler Philippines Corp. v. Court of Appeals

Facts:

Petitioner is a domestic corporation engaged in the assembling and sale of motor vehicles and other automotive products. Respondent Sambok Motors Co., a general partnership, during the period relevant to these proceedings, was its dealer for automotive products with offices at Bacolod (Sambok, Bacolod) and Iloilo (Sambok, Iloilo).

On October 2, 1970, Sambok, Bacolod, ordered from petitioner various automotive products worth P30,909.61, payable in 45 days; that on November 25, 1970, petitioner delivered said products to its forwarding agent, Allied Brokerage Corporation, for shipment; that Allied Brokerage loaded the goods on board the M/S Doña Florentina, a vessel owned and operated by Negros Navigation Company, for delivery to Sambok, Bacolod; that when petitioner tried to collect from the latter the amount of P31,037.56, representing the price of the spare parts plus handling charges, Sambok, Bacolod, refused to pay claiming that it had not received the merchandise; that petitioner also demanded the return of the merchandise or their value from Allied Brokerage and Negros Navigation, but both denied any liability.In its Answer, Sambok, Bacolod, denied having received from petitioner or from any of its co-defendants, the automotive products referred to in the Complaint, and professed no knowledge of having ordered from petitioner said articles.

Issue:

WON Sambok Bacolod bears the loss of the cargo for which it is liable in damages to Chrysler.

Held:

No, Sambok Bacolod cannot be faulted for not accepting or refusing to accept the shipment from Negros Navigation four years after shipment.

It was found out that upon receipt of the Bill of Lading, Sambok Bacolod initiated, but did not pursue stepts to take delivery as they were advised by Negros Navigation that because some party were missing, they would just be informed as soon as the missing parts were located. It was only four years later that the said parts were found in their off-shore bodega but were already deteriorated and valueless.The evidence is clear that Negros Navigation could not produce the merchandise nor ascertain its whereabouts at the time Sambok, Bacolod, was ready to take delivery. Where the seller delivers to the buyer a quantity of goods less than he contracted to sell, the buyer may reject them.

From the evidentiary record, Negros Navigation was the party negligent in failing to deliver the complete shipment either to Sambok, Bacolod, or to Sambok, Iloilo, but as the Trial Court found, petitioner failed to comply with the conditions precedent to the filing of a judicial action. Thus, in the last analysis, it is petitioner that must shoulder the resulting loss. The general rule that before, delivery, the risk of loss is home by the seller who is still the owner, under the principle of "res petit domino", is applicable in petitioner's case.

In sum, the judgment of respondent Appellate Court, will have to be sustained not on the basis of misdelivery but on non-delivery since the merchandise was never placed in the control and possession of Sambok, Bacolod, the vendee.

Norkis Distributors, Inc. v. CA

Facts:

Petitioner Norkis Distributors, Inc. is the distributor of Yamaha motorcycles in Negros Occidental. Alberto Nepales bought from the Norkis Bacolod branch a brand new Yamaha Wonderbike motorcycle. The price of P7,500 was payable by means of a Letter of Guaranty from the DBP, which Norkis’ Branch Manager Labajo agrred to accept. Hence, credit was extended to Nepales for the price of the motorcycle payable by DBP upon release of his motorcycle loan. As security for the loan, Nepales would execute a chattel mortgage on the motorcycle in favor of DBP. Branch Manager Labajo issued Norkis Sales Invoice No. 0120 (Exh.1) showing that the contract of sale of the motorcycle had been perfected. Nepales signed the sales invoice to signify his conformity with the terms of the sale. In the meantime, however, the motorcycle remained in Norkis' possession.

The motorcycle was then registered in the Land Transportation Commission in the name of Alberto Nepales. The motorcycle was delivered to a certain Julian Nepales who was allegedly the agent of Alberto Nepales but the latter denies it. The motorcycle met an accident and an investigation conducted by the DBP revealed that the unit was being driven by a certain Zacarias Payba at the time of the accident. The unit was a total wreck, was returned, and stored inside Norkis' warehouse.

DBP released the proceeds of private respondent's motorcycle loan to Norkis in thetotal sum of P7,500. As the price of the motorcycle later increased to P7,828 in March, 1980, Nepalespaid the difference of P328 and demanded the delivery of the motorcycle. When Norkis could not deliver,he filed an action for specific performance with damages against Norkis in the RTC of Negros Occidental.He alleged that Norkis failed to deliver the motorcycle which he purchased, thereby causing himdamages. Norkis answered that the motorcycle had already been delivered to private respondent beforethe accident, hence, the risk of loss or damage had to be borne by him as owner of the unit.

Issue:

WON there had already been a transfer of ownership of the motorcycle to Alberto Nepales at the time it was destroyed

Held:

No. The issuance of a sales invoice does not prove transfer of ownership of the thing sold to the buyer. An invoice is nothing more than a detailed statement of the nature, quantity and cost of the thing sold and has been considered not a bill of sale. In all forms of delivery, it is necessary that the act of delivery whether constructive or actual, be coupled with the intention of delivering the thing. The act, without the intention, is insufficient.

When the motorcycle was registered by Norkis in the name of private respondent, Norkis did not intend yet to transfer the title or ownership to Nepales, but only to facilitate the execution of a chattel mortgage in favor of the DBP for the release of the buyer's motorcycle loan. The Letter of Guarantee (Exh. 5) issued by the DBP, reveals that the execution in its favor of a chattel mortgage over the purchased vehicle is a pre-requisite for the approval of the buyer's loan. If Norkis would not accede to that arrangement, DBP would not approve private respondent's loan application and, consequently, there would be no sale.

In other words, the critical factor in the different modes of effecting delivery, which gives legal effect to the act, is the actual intention of the vendor to deliver, and its acceptance by the vendee. Without that intention, there is no tradition.

Article 1496 of the Civil Code which provides that "in the absence of an express assumption of risk by the buyer, the things sold remain at seller's risk until the ownership thereof is transferred to the buyer," is applicable to this case, for there was neither an actual nor constructive delivery of the thing sold, hence, the risk of loss should be borne by the seller, Norkis, which was still the owner and possessor of the motorcycle when it was wrecked. This is in accordance with the well-known doctrine of res perit domino.

Peope v. Manantan

Full Text: http://www.chanrobles.com/scdecisions/jurisprudence1962/jul1962/gr_l-14129_1962.php

Facts:
Guillermo Manantan was charged with a violation of Section 54, Revised Election Code. However, Manantan claims that as "justice of peace", the defendant is not one of the officers enumerated in the said section. The lower court denied the motion to dismiss holding that a justice of peace is within the purview of Section 54.
Under Section 54, "No justice, judge, fiscal, treasurer, or assessor of any province, no officer or employee of the Army, no member of the national, provincial, city, municipal or rural police force and no classified civil service officer or employee shall aid any candidate, or exert any influence in any manner in a election or take part therein, except to vote, if entitled thereto, or to preserve public peace, if he is a peace officer.".
Defendant submits that the said election was taken from Section 449 of the Revised Administration Code wherein, "No judge of the First Instance, justice of the peace, or treasurer, fiscal or assessor of any province and no officer or employee of the Philippine Constabulary, or any Bureau or employee of the classified civil service, shall aid any candidate or exert influence in any manner in any election or take part therein otherwise than exercising the right to vote.". He claims that the words "justice of peace" was omitted revealed the intention of Legislature to exclude justices of peace from its operation.

Issue:
Is justice of peace included in the prohibition of Section 64 of the Revised Election Code?

Held: 
Yes, it is included in Section 54.  Justices of the peace were expressly included in Section 449 of the Revised Administrative Code because the kinds of judges therein were specified, i.e., judge of the First Instance and justice of the peace. In Section 54, however, there was no necessity therefore to include justices of the peace in the enumeration because the legislature had availed itself of the more generic and broader term, "judge.", which includes all kinds of judges.
A "justice of the peace" is a judge. A "judge" is a public officer, who, by virtue of his office, is clothed with judicial authority. This term includes all officers appointed to to decide litigated questions while acting in that capacity, including justices of the peace, and even jurors, it is said, who are judges of facts.
From the history of Section 54 of REC, the first omission of the word "justice of the peace" was effected in Section 48 of Commonwealth Act No. 357 and not in the present code as averred by defendant-appellee. Whenever the word "judge" was qualified by the phrase "of the First Instance', the words "justice of the peace" were omitted. It follows that when the legislature omitted the words "justice of the peace" in RA 180, it did not intend to exempt the said officer from its operation. Rather, it had considered the said officer as already comprehended in the broader term "judge".
The rule of "casus omisus pro omisso habendus est" is likewise invoked by the defendant-appellee. Under the said rule, a person, object or thing omitted from an enumeration must be held to have been omitted intentionally. However, it is applicable only if the omission has been clearly established. In the case at bar, the legislature did not exclude or omit justices of the peace from the enumeration of officers precluded from engaging in partisan political activities. In Section 54, justices of the peace were just called "judges". Also, the application of this rule does not proceed from the mere fact that a case is criminal in nature, but rather from a reasonable certainty that a particular person, object or thing has been omitted from a legislative enumeration. In the case at bar, there is no omission but only substitution of terms.
The rule that penal statutes are given a strict construction is not the only factor controlling the interpretation of such laws; instead, the rule merely serves as an additional, single factor to be considered as an aid in determining the meaning of penal laws.
Also, the purpose of the statute s to enlarge the officers within its purview. Justices of the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, and various judges, such as the judges of the Court of Industrial Relations, judges of the Court of Agrarian Relations, etc., who were not included in the prohibition under the old statute, are now within its encompass.
The rule "expressio unius est exclusion alterius" has been erroneously applied by CA and lower courts because they were not able to give reasons for the exclusion of the legislature for the term "justices of peace".

San Pablo Manufacturing Corporation v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue

Facts: http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2006/jun2006/gr_147749_2006.html

Facts:

SPMC is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of milling, manufacturing and exporting of coconut oil and other allied products. It was assessed and ordered to pay by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue the total amount of P8,182,182.85 representing deficiency miller’s tax and manufacturer’s sales tax,among other deficiency taxes, for taxable year 1987. The deficiency miller’s tax was imposed on SPMC’s sales of crude oil to United Coconut Chemicals, Inc. (UNICHEM) while the deficiency sales tax was applied on its sales of corn and edible oil as manufactured products.
SPMC opposed the assessments but the Commissioner denied its protest. SPMC appealed to CTA but the tax on sales of corn and edible opils was only cancelled and the miller's tax was upheld. The CA, on the other hand, dismissed the petition on the ground that the verification and certification against forum shopping was lacking.

Issues:
(1) Whether or not the CA erred when it dismissed the petition on the ground that it did not comply with the requirements and verification against forum shopping.
(2) Whether or not SPMC's sale of crude oil to UNICHEM was subject to 3% miller's tax.


Held:
(1) No, CA did not err in the dismissal of the petition. Under Rule 43, Section 5 of the Rules of Court, appeals from the CTA and quasi-judicial agencies to the Court of Appeals should be verified. A pleading required to be verified which lacks proper verification shall be treated as an unsigned pleading.
Moreover, a petition for review under Rule 43 requires a sworn certification against forum shopping. Failure of the petitioner to comply with any of the requirements of a petition for review is sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition.
In the case at bar, the petition of SPMC was not properly verified. SPMC merely relied on the alleged inherent power of its chief financial officer to represent SPMC in all matters regarding the finances of the corporation including, among others, the filing of suits to defend or protect it from assessments and to recover erroneously paid taxes. SPMC even admitted that no power of attorney, secretary’s certificate or board resolution to prove the affiant’s authority was attached to the petition. Thus, the petition was not properly verified. Since the petition lacked proper verification, it was to be treated as an unsigned pleading subject to dismissal.

(2) SPMC's sale of crude coconut oil to UNICHEM was subject to the 3% miller's tax.

The language of the exempting clause of Section 168 of the 1987 Tax Code was clear. The tax exemption applied only to the exportation of rope, coconut oil, palm oil, copra by-products and dessicated coconuts, whether in their original state or as an ingredient or part of any manufactured article or products, by the proprietor or operator of the factory or by the miller himself.
The language of the exemption proviso did not warrant the interpretation advanced by SPMC. Nowhere did it provide that the exportation made by the purchaser of the materials enumerated in the exempting clause or the manufacturer of products utilizing the said materials was covered by the exemption. Since SPMC’s situation was not within the ambit of the exemption, it was subject to the 3% miller’s tax imposed under Section 168 of the 1987 Tax Code.

Where the law enumerates the subject or condition upon which it applies, it is to be construed as excluding from its effects all those not expressly mentioned. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius. Anything that is not included in the enumeration is excluded therefrom and a meaning that does not appear nor is intended or reflected in the very language of the statute cannot be placed therein.20 The rule proceeds from the premise that the legislature would not have made specific enumerations in a statute if it had the intention not to restrict its meaning and confine its terms to those expressly mentioned.
The rule of expressio unius est exclusio alterius is a canon of restrictive interpretation. Its application in this case is consistent with the construction of tax exemptions in strictissimi juris against the taxpayer. To allow SPMC’s claim for tax exemption will violate these established principles and unduly derogate sovereign authority.

Vera v. Cuevas

Full Text: http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1979/may1979/gr_l_33693_1979.html

Facts:
Private respondents herein, are engaged in the manufacture, sale and distribution of filled milk products throughout the Philippines. The products of private respondent, Consolidated Philippines Inc. are marketed and sold under the brand Darigold whereas those of private respondent, General Milk Company (Phil.), Inc., under the brand "Liberty;" and those of private respondent, Milk Industries Inc., under the brand "Dutch Baby." Private respondent, Institute of Evaporated Filled Milk Manufacturers of the Philippines, is a corporation organized for the principal purpose of upholding and maintaining at its highest the standards of local filled milk industry, of which all the other private respondents are members.
CIR required the respondents to withdraw from the market all of their filled milk products which do not bear the inscription required by Section 169 of the Tax Code within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the order. Failure to comply will result to penalties. Section 169 talks of the inscription to be placed in skimmed milk wherein all condensed skimmed milk and all milk in whatever form, from which the fatty part has been removed totally or in part, sold or put on sale in the Philippines shall be clearly and legibly marked on its immediate containers, and in all the language in which such containers are marked, with the words, "This milk is not suitable for nourishment for infants less than one year of age," or with other equivalent words.
The CFI Manila ordered the CIR to perpetually restrain from requiring the respondents to print on the labels of their product the words "This milk is not suitable for nourishment for infants less than one year of age.". Also, it ordered the Fair Trade Board to perpetually restrain from investigating the respondents related to the manufacture/sale of their filled milk products.

Issue:
Whether or not skimmed milk is included in the scope of Section 169 of the Tax Code.

Held:
No, Section 169 of the Tax Code is not applicable to filled milk. The use of specific and qualifying terms "skimmed milk" in the headnote and "condensed skimmed milk" in the text of the cited section, would restrict the scope of the general clause "all milk, in whatever form, from which the fatty pat has been removed totally or in part." In other words, the general clause is restricted by the specific term "skimmed milk" under the familiar rule of ejusdem generis that general and unlimited terms are restrained and limited by the particular terms they follow in the statute.
The difference, therefore, between skimmed milk and filled milk is that in the former, the fatty part has been removed while in the latter, the fatty part is likewise removed but is substituted with refined coconut oil or corn oil or both. It cannot then be readily or safely assumed that Section 169 applies both to skimmed milk and filled milk. It cannot then be readily or safely assumed that Section 169 applies both to skimmed milk and filled milk. Also, it has been found out that "the filled milk products of the petitioners (now private respondents) are safe, nutritious, wholesome and suitable for feeding infants of all ages" (p. 44, Rollo) and that "up to the present, Filipino infants fed since birth with filled milk have not suffered any defects, illness or disease attributable to their having been fed with filled milk."
Hence, applying Section 169 to it would cause a deprivation of property without due process of law.